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SL+ LF-G VERNMENT: CONSTITUTIONAL AN
JURISDICTIONAL ISSUES*
Peter W. Hogg** and Mary Ellen Turpel***
Toronto and Halifax
The purpose of this paper is to make suggestions as to how Aboriginal selfgovernment could be implemented without any amendment ofthe Constitution of
Canada. The authors suggest that elements ofthe Charlottetown Constitutional
Accord could be included in apolitical accord or accords, which could become the
frameworkfor self-government negotiations. The authors discuss the nature ofthe
powers that could be included in a self-government agreement, making extensive
reference to the Yukon First Nation Self-GovernmentAgreements. The issues that
are examined include personal and territorial jurisdictions, concurrent and
exclusive powers, the relationship ofAboriginal laws tofederal andprovincial (or
territorial) laws, the administration ofjusticeand thefnancing ofself-government.
Theauthors recommend that self-governmentagreementsshouldbe constitutionally
protected, and they explain how that can be accomplished under the existing
Constitution . The applicability of the Charter ofRights is also discussed, and a
recommendation is madefor the development ofAboriginal constitutions, which
could include Aboriginal Charters ofRights.
Le but de cet article est d'apporter des suggestions, afin de savoir comment
l'autonomie autochtone pourrait être implantée sansamendementde la Constitution
du Canada. Les auteurs suggèrent qu'une part de l'accord constitutionnel de
* This article was originally prepared for the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples .
The authors acknowledge the support of the Commission, and are grateful for the
Commission's permission to publish the article independently of the Commission's
studies, which will be available in 1995-96. The authors also acknowledge the help of
Douglas Brown, David Hawkes, Paul Joffe, Patrick Monahan, Arthur Pape and Brian
Slattery, each ofwhom commented on an earlier draft of the article.
** Peter W. Hogg Q.C., of Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, North York,
Ontario.
*** Mary Ellen Turpel, ofthe FacultyofLaw, Dalhousie University, Halifax, NovaScotia .
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Charlottetownpourraitêtreinclusedansunouplusieursaccordspolitiques, ce qui
deviendrait le cadre des négociations sur l'autonomie. Les auteurs discutent de la
nature des pouvoirs qui pourraient être incluse dans l'accord sur l'autonomie,
faisant largement référence à l'accord sur l'autonomie de la Première Nation du
Yukon . Les sujets qui sont examinés comprennent les juridictions personnelles et
territoriales, les pouvoirs concordants et exclusifs, la relation entre les lois
autochtones et les loisfédérales etprovinciales (ou territoriales), l'administration
de lajustice et lefinancement de l'autonomie. Les auteurs recommandent que les
accords sur l'autonomie soient constitutionnellement protégés, et ils expliquent
comment cela pourrait être accompli dans le cadre de la constitution actuelle.
L'application de la Charte des droitsestaussi discutée, et une recommandation est
formulée pour le développement de constitutions autochtones qui pourraient
inclure des Chartes des droits autochtones.
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Introduction

Since the failure ofthe Charlottetown Accord' in October 1992, there has been
uncertainty about the future of Aboriginal self-governmentandparticularly the
implementationofthe Aboriginalpartoftheproposed constitutional amendments .
It appears that constitutional reform is not on the national agenda in the wake
of the `No' vote . While many negotiations are under way between various
Aboriginal peoplesz and Canadian governments onissues ranging from criminal
justice to land claims, the constitutional import of any agreements produced is
unclear. Aboriginal peoples have repeatedly expressed their frustration withthe
premises, scope and the pace of present negotiations and the limited progress
suggests that a fundamental rethinking of government policy and practice is in
order.
The Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples' discussion paper, Partners
in Confederation, 3 provided clarification of the source and some ideas for the
implementation oftheright of self-government. Moreover, the election in 1993
of a Liberal federal government, whose policies included the commitment to
recognize the inherent right to self-government and implement it without reopening constitutional discussions, suggests that a new political climate exists 4
The purpose ofthis article is to explore the extent to which progress can be
made immediately, within the existing Constitution of Canada, on the
implementation of the inherent right of self-government. We do not consider
arguments outside the Constitution of Canada in this paper, although we
acknowledge that full political consideration of self governmentwouldinvolve
.' In particular, we want to analyze the legal and
exploring such arguments
constitutional issues involved in the implementation of the inherent right
without the express constitutional amendments proposed by the Charlottetown
Accord . Theseinclude the articulation ofAboriginal governmentaljurisdictions
in light of existing federal and provincial laws of general application; the
1 The references in the paper are
August 28, 1992 (Ottawa: Canadian

all to the Consensus Report on the Constitution of
Intergovernmental Conference Secretariat, 1992)
(hereafter referred to as the "Consensus Report"] .
'We use the expression "Aboriginal peoples" to refer to First Nations (Indian), Inuit
and Métis peoples collectively . When specific reference is made to negotiations or
agreements the more specific terminology is employed.
s Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, Partners in Confederation: Aboriginal
Peoples, Self-Government and the Constitution (Ottawa: The Commission, 1993) .
4 October 8, 1993 statementofLiberalleaderdean Chrétien inSaskatoon, Saskatchewan
when he unveiled the Aboriginal Platform oftheLiberal Party ofCanada. The LiberalParty
platform, called `the red book' (Liberal Party of Canada, Creating Opportunity, (1993) at
2), contains several critical policy commitments, including a commitment that "The
Liberal government will acton thepremise that the inherent rightof self-government is an
existing Aboriginal and treaty right within the meaning of section 35 ofthe Constitution
Act, 1982" .
'For example, we do not consider arguments rooted in Aboriginal peoples' nation-tonation relationship with the Crown or Aboriginal law and spirituality or the international
legal arguments on self-determination .
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financing of self-government; the constitutional status of self-government
agreements ; the resolution ofdisputes over inconsistent (Aboriginal and federal
or provincial) laws; and the application of the Canadian Charter ofRights and
Freedoms to Aboriginal governments.
The Charlottetown Accord expressly recognized an "inherent" right of
Aboriginal self-government.' This is important from both a political and legal
perspective. The right ofself-government was understood in the Charlottetown
negotiations to be a pre-existing rightrooted in Aboriginal peoples' occupation
and government of this land prior to European settlement. This is not a new
concept . Although Canadian courts have not explicitly recognized the inherent
right ofself-government(because they have notyetbeen faced squarely with the
issue), the courts have recognized other Aboriginal rights. The Supreme Court
of Canada has accepted that these rights derive from the fact that Aboriginal
peoples have existed in Canada for a very long time and have exercised rights
which must be respected by more recent immigrants .' As Professor Brian
Slattery has shown, Aboriginal rights are rights that are held by Aboriginal
peoples, notby virtue of Crowngrant, legislation or treaty, but "by reason of the
fact that aboriginal peoples were once independent, self-governing entities in
possession of most of the lands now making up Canada".' This logic supports
the fact that the rights which Aboriginal peoples enjoy in Canadian law are
inherent to their own history and experience as the first peoples. Many treaties
concluded between Aboriginal peoples and the Crown also demonstrate that
Aboriginal peoples exercised their rights of self-government by structuring
their relations with governments in Canada on the basis of consent and mutual
recognition.
The inherent nature of the right of self-government does not answer the
question of what the right means today, and how it relates to the existing
constitutional andpolitical structures . Uncertainties on these issues make high
level political discussions on what Aboriginal self-government means in a
contemporary political context essential, because at present the issues are wide
open to judicial interpretation if left to the courts, and they are not suitable for
resolution by courts .9 It is in the best interests of both governments and
Aboriginal peoples to explore options short of constitutional amendment
Consensus Report, supra footnote 1 at 12.
' R. v. Sparrow, [199011 S.C.R. 1075. In this case, Dickson C.J. and La Forest J.,
writing for a unanimous Supreme Court of Canada, expressly recognized the right of a
member of the Musqueam Indian band to fish for salmon in the Fraser River "where his
ancestors had fished from time immemorial".
I
B. Slattery, "The Constitutional GuaranteeofAboriginal andTreaty Rights" (1983)
8Queen's L.J. 232 at242. SeealsoB. Slattery, "Understanding Aboriginal Rights" (1987)
66 Can. Bar Rev. 314.
9
Theissues arenot suitable forresolution by courts because only politicaldiscussions
canadequately addressmatters ofjurisdiction, financing andintergovernmental cooperation.
Legal reasoning in the constitutional context is not broad enough to embrace all of these
dimensions .
6
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(although constitutional amendment would be the preferred approach) .1° What
other approaches are there andhow would they be viewed from aconstitutional
law standpoint? Answering this question is the purpose of our paper: we want
to explore ways to move ahead on Aboriginal self-government in apeaceful and
constitutional fashion . Several approaches to the issue ofjurisdiction, status of
agreements and justiciability will be explored in the pages to follow . The
political feasibility of the ideas developed herein is for elected officials to
evaluate: we are simply trying to suggest what is legally possible under the
present Constitution .
The Charlottetown Accord provided amechanism for defining the scope of
self-government rights for particular Aboriginal peoples . It also implied that
Aboriginal governmentswould be equivalentinstatus to the existing two orders
of government inCanada bydescribingAboriginal governments as one ofthree
orders of government ;' I in otherwords, Aboriginal governments were tobe seen
as sovereign in their own spheres . The Accord was not specific on many
important points : it called for (in another draft accord) a process to work out
problems which could arise in negotiations and jurisdictional conflicts. It also
provided for a gradual transition to self-government based on negotiated
agreements, delay in justiciability of the inherent right, and rules for dealing
with inconsistent laws. It is fair to say that, while the recognition of an inherent
right ofself-government was animportant feature ofthe Charlottetown Accord,
what was far more significant, from a practical perspective; was the method
proposed to invigorate the right. Although the negotiation of self-government
agreements has-been on the national agenda since the early 1980s, the Accord
for the first time would have established a firm legal and policy framework to
govern negotiations, to resolve preliminary issues such as identification of
parties, to clarify the scope of Aboriginal jurisdiction, 12 to ensure adequate
funding for the process and for the resulting governments, and to provide for the
constitutionalization of the self-government agreements and for their
implementation . In our view, this comprehensive structure, which was agreed
toby all governments, was the trulyinnovative feature ofthe Accord, and which
can be built upon.
1° In our view, comprehensive constitutional amendments on Aboriginal selfgovernment would be the preferred approach because they would assist in clarifying the
status and nature of Aboriginal governments in light of the already defined federal and
provincial jurisdictional structure of Canadian federation. Moreover, comprehensive
constitutional amendments would ensure that Aboriginal government jurisdiction not be
"inferior" in status to the existing two orders of government, which already have a secure
constitutional footing with established rules for the resolution of jurisdictional conflicts .
This is not to say that the courts would not support exclusive Aboriginal jurisdiction over
certain subjectmatters without constitutional reforms, butthatcomprehensive amendments
would save resources on litigation and acrimonious jurisdictional conflicts .
11 Consensus Report, supra footnote 1 at 12.
12 The Accord included provisions allowing for Aboriginal peoples who already have
treaties with the Crown to elect a treaty review/renovation process as a vehicle for the
implementation of their inherent right of self-government .
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The provisions of the Charlottetown Accord are critical, because the
conventional body ofconstitutional law inCanada is not easily squared with the
inherent right of Aboriginal self-government. There are many foundational
notions in constitutional law which are inconsistent with the recognition of
Aboriginal self-government. Principal among these is the doctrine of
exhaustiveness, which suggests that all available jurisdiction in Canada is
currently divided between the federal and provincial governments by sections
91 and 92 (and the other jurisdictional provisions) of the Constitution Act,
1867.13 This doctrine appears to leave no room for Aboriginal self-government
except as a delegated government under the federal or provincial division of
legislative and administrative responsibility . Of course, the doctrine of
exhaustiveness was developed without regard for the Aboriginal reality in
Canada and, asthe RoyalCommission on Aboriginal Peoples has suggested, the
doctrine of exhaustiveness may go to the scope of jurisdiction and not the
exclusiveness ofjurisdiction . 14Moreover, the doctrine developed in the context
offederal-provincialjurisdictional disputes in which Aboriginal peoples played
no role.
The doctrine of exhaustiveness was also developed before section 35 ofthe
Constitution Act, 1982 was introduced into the Canadian Constitution to give
more explicit constitutional protection to Aboriginal and treaty rights .
Constitutional lawyers and elected officials must review such doctrines that
reflectthe Eurocentric bias ofCanadian constitutional law andgovernment, and
reorder institutions and doctrine so to give full expression to the longstanding
Aboriginal presence in Canada. This review will become more urgent as the
implementation ofself-government progresses. The doctrine of exhaustiveness
should not be an obstacle in the way of articulating Aboriginal government
jurisdiction. It is a matter that requires discussion, but it is not fatal to the
implementation ofself-government within theexisting constitutional framework.
1. Expressing Aboriginal Self-Government Jurisdiction
A.

Contextual Statement

Beyond the recognition of an inherent right of self-government, the
implementation of the right in the particular context of an Aboriginal people is
a more complex legal challenge. There are different Aboriginal peoples with
diverse government traditions, territories and aspirations. A flexible approach
is required to respond to these various situations. The Charlottetown Accord
provided for a flexible method ofexpressingthe scopeofaboriginal jurisdiction
which is worth examining closely, because itis ahelpful middle ground between
two extremes . At one extreme is the simple recognition of the inherent right
"This principle was articulated in A. G. Ont. v. A. G. Can. (Reference Appeal), [1912)
A.C. 571 at 583, in which the Judicial Committee ofthe Privy Council said that "whatever
belongs to self-government in Canada belongs either to the Dominion or to the provinces,
within the limits of the British North America Act".
t4
Partners in Confederation, supra footnote 3 at 32.
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without any guiding framework for implementation . This approach is broad and
vague enough to respond to the diverse situations and aspirations of Aboriginal
peoples, but its very breadth and vagueness makes concrete implementation
more difficult . At the other extreme is a detailed blueprint for self-government
that would apply to all Aboriginal governments without regard for their
differing situations, cultures and aspirations .

The Charlottetown Accord proposed that a "contextual statement" should
form part of the Aboriginal Self-government package of constitutional
amendments . The idea of the contextual statement was to frame self-government
jurisdiction in light of the purposes and objectives that should be served by the
inherent right . It was designed to be flexible enough to accommodate different
circumstances and conditions, and yet detailed enough to indicate the general
scope of self-government . The text of the proposed contextual statement is
worth recalling in full, although we note that no final legal text was ratified:
The exercise of the right of self-government includes the authority of the duly
constituted legislative bodies ofAboriginal peoples, each withinits ownjurisdiction : 1 s
(a) to safeguard and develop their languages, cultures, economies, identities,
institutions and traditions ; and,
(b) to develop, maintain and strengthen their relationship with their lands, waters and
environment
so as to determine and control their development as peoples according to their own
values and priorities and ensure the integrity of their societies. 's .
The contextual statement describes the purposes of self-government and the
general functions of Aboriginal legislative bodies and, since it has been agreed
to by governments and Aboriginal organizations, it remains relevant in setting
the general purpose or context for self-government negotiations . The statement
emphasises the authority of Aboriginal govermnents to enact and enforce laws
which will enable Aboriginal peoples to control their own development as
peoples, to set priorities to ensure the development of their members, and to
protect their lands, languages and cultures .
One issue not explicitly mentioned in the contextual statement is the
objective of self-government implementation for those Aboriginal peoples with
treaties . Many First Nations leaders speak of "treaty government", and suggest
that their treaties are an effective vehicle for the implementation of the inherent
right of self-government . Confusion over the relationship between treaties and
the package of self-government amendments in the Charlottetown Accord was
a source of dissension during the debate over the Accord in Aboriginal
communities . Clarification on this point is required . As the President of the
Union of Nova Scotia Indians suggested to the Royal Commission on Aboriginal
Peoples :

's The expression "each within its own jurisdiction" was added to make it clear
that
an Aboriginal government will exercise its authority within its jurisdiction . In our opinion,
this is redundant and could be eliminated without taking away from the meaning of the
statement .
16
Consensus Report, supra footnote 1 at 17 .
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We see our right of self-government as an inherent right which does not come from
other governments . It does not originate in our Treaties. The right ofself-government
and self-determination comes fromthe Mi'kmaqpeople-it isthrough their authority
thatwe govern . The Treaties reflect the Crown's recognition that we were, and would
remain, self-governing, but they did not create our Nationhood ... In this light, the
treaties should be effective vehicles for the implementation of our constitutionallyprotected right toexercisejurisdiction and authority asgovernments . Self-government
can start with a process of interpreting and fully implementing the 1752 Treaty, to
build on it to an understanding of the political relationship between the Mi'kmaq
people and the Crown."
Treaty implementation was dealt with in a separate section ofthe Charlottetown
Accord," although the relationship between treaty implementation and selfgovernment implementation was not clearly linked. For some Aboriginal
peoples, the implementation of the inherent right of self-government is
inseparably linked to the fulfilment of a pre-existing treaty relationship.
We suggest thatarevised version ofthe contextual statement should reflect
the central role oftreaties andtreaty-based government forTreaty First Nations.
This could be accomplished by adding to the concluding language of the
contextual statement some additional language such as the following: " ... and
recognizing thatfor Treaty FirstNations the implementation of self-government
will mean the articulation of rights and responsibilities flowing from existing
treaties, which should be fully honoured and implemented by Canadian
governments as a central part of self-government implementation ."
The text ofthe contextual statement contemplates thatthe "duly constituted
legislative bodies" can act toachieve certain aims and objectives. The requirement
of duly constituted legislative bodies would require the Aboriginal people in
question to develop a constitution with provision for a law-making body and
demonstrated support among the people for this institution.19 While it is
presumed that such a constitution would be written, it could also take another
form more consistentwith Aboriginal customs and traditions ifso desired bythe
particular Aboriginal people . For example, in the Iroquoian nation, wampum
belts maybe usedto articulate the constitution andthe respectiveresponsibilities
of legislative and other government bodies.
The aims the Aboriginal legislative body would pursue are defined by the
contextual statement in subsections (a) and (b), and especially in the concluding
clause, where the overall objective is that of determining and controlling the
particular people's development according to their own values and priorities
and in order to ensure the integrity of their society . This statement marks a
dramatic break with the status quo of delegated and limited power under the
Indian Act or other statutory schemes affecting Aboriginal peoples . The
17
Union of Nova Scotia Indians, 1992. Alex Christmas (Address to the Royal
Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, 6 May 1993 at Eskasoni, Nova Scotia) .
'$ Consensus Report, supra footnote 1 at 13.
cv The contextual statement does not impose a certain political structure. This is an
internal matter for Aboriginal peoples to determine and, once agreed upon internally, to
demonstrate community support for the institutions and structures of government.
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statement confirms the universal view thatthe Indian Act mustbe abandoned in
favour of a relationship based on internal self-determination .
It was never imagined that the contextual statement would definitively
settle thepowers ofan Aboriginal government, orthat itwouldresolve conflicts
between Aboriginal laws and other laws . What the clause would do is to offer
a broader prism through which to view the discussions on self-government
between individual Aboriginal communities and governments that would
resolve matters ofjurisdiction . It is the foundation upon which a list of powers
canbe developedby aparticular Aboriginalpeople and an agreementnegotiated
with government to clarify jurisdiction and fiscal responsibility.
B.

Optionsfor a new Contextual Statement

Becauseofthefailureofthe Charlottetown Accord, thecontextual statement
did not make its way into the Constitution, and it is only realistic to recognize
that constitutional amendments on self-government are unlikely in the near
future. Nonetheless, language close to the contextual statement could still
provide the framework for progress on the development of self-government
institutions . Forexample,thereis nothingtopreventthe Aboriginal organizations
andthe federal andprovincial governments from entering into a political accord
or accords on a framework for the implementation of the, inherent right of selfgovernment.
In addition to the option of a political accord, Aboriginal peoples and
governments may explore the option of federal legislation to provide such a
framework. Provided such legislation is the product of consent on thepart ofthe
Aboriginal peoples and their representatives, this option would enable the
development of specific political accords with Aboriginal people and allow for
flexibility inaccommodating the differences in the circumstances and priorities
of Aboriginal peoples . One advantage of legislation is that it would be costefficient and expeditious rather thannegotiating separate political accords on all
frameworkissues with each Aboriginal people concerned. The legislationcould
establishbasic principles whichcouldthenbe particularizedin specific accords.
Either through political accords or legislation, a reworked contextual
statement could form a central component of a framework for implementation
of the inherent right of self-government. We would suggest the following text
for inclusion in a political accord or legislation:
The exercise of the right of self-government includes the authority of the duly
constituted legislative bodies of Aboriginal peoples:
(a) to safeguardanddevelop theirlanguages,cultures, economies, identities,institutions
and traditions ; and
(b) to develop, maintain and strengthen their relationship with their lands, waters
and environment
so as to determine and control their development as peoples according to their own
values andpriorities and ensure the integrity of their societies andrecognizing that for
Treaty FirstNations the implementationofself-governmentwillrequirethe articulation
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of rights and responsibilities flowing from existing treaties, which should be fully
honoured and implemented by Canadian governments.
C. Process for Negotiating Agreements
The goal of a political accord or other framework for the implementation
of the inherent right of self-government has to be the conclusion of negotiated
agreements with particular First Nations, Inuit and M6tis peoples on self
government jurisdiction, financing, and dispute resolution . We have a strong
preference for a revived political framework leading to negotiated agreements .
The alternative ofinaction by governments would lead to unilateral initiatives
by Aboriginal peoples, which would give rise to legal disputes, the resolution
ofwhich would be highly unpredictable.2°In our view, an agreed-upon contextual
statement would help to facilitate self-government agreements, because it
provides the objectives ofself-government which should guide the negotiations
and the content of any agreement.
Any self-government agreement between aspecific Aboriginalcommunity
and government(s) will of necessity include a list or lists of different heads of
powers under which the Aboriginal government would have the discretion to
legislate . Moreover, any list of powers should relate to the contextual statement
and be interpreted inlight of its objectives to facilitate the implementation ofthe
right of self-government . The contextual statement would not be the only guide
to the development of heads oflegislative power or the only interpretative aid.
In the case of Treaty First Nations, for example, there maybe treaty rights which
would carry with them some jurisdictional responsibility ." Modern land claims
agreements will also contain powers of management ofthe lands and resources
belonging to an Aboriginal people.
II. Scope ofAboriginal Jurisdiction
In this essay, wemakefrequentreference to the Yukon Indian Self-Government
Agreements?' The Yukon Agreements are helpful because they illustrate the
progress which is possible within the existing constitutional framework as well
We do not mean to suggest that Aboriginal governments must wait for the
conclusion of agreements in order to exercise jurisdiction . The Royal Commission on
Aboriginal Peoples has already accepted this point in Partners in Confederation, supra
footnote 3 at 36 where it was recognized thatAboriginal peoples could move immediately
in areas of core jurisdiction without negotiated agreements. We do not doubt that this is
the case as a matter ofconstitutional law. However, the path of negotiation is the path of
social peace as well as thepath which will not divert resources to the courts over abstract
and complex legal battles .
21 For example, Treaty 6 requires the Chiefs to maintain peace and order among their
people and in the dealings oftheirpeople with non-Indians. To implement this agreement
one would imagine jurisdiction over the administration ofjustice would be required .
'2
There are four self-government agreements : The Champagne and Aishihik First
Nations Self-GovemmentAgreement;theFirstNation ofNacho Nyak DunSelf-Government
Agreement ; the Teslin Tlingit Council Self-Government Agreement and the Vuntut
Gwichin Self-Government Agreement. All four Agreements were signed in Whitehorse
2°
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as the need for reconsideration of certain government policies and approaches
which impede the implementation of self-government." To understand those
Agreements some background is necessary.
The CouncilforYukon Indians, whichrepresents the fourteen First Nations
in the Yukon, has entered into an "Umbrella Final Agreement" with the
Government of Canada and the Yukon.' This Agreement contains the basic
terms of the Yukon land claims settlement, but it is not a "land claims
agreement" within the meaning of section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982, and
it is not legally effective unless and until its provisions are incorporated into a
Final Agreement entered into by a Yukon First Nation . Four First Nationshave
enteredinto Final Agreements which incorporate all the terms ofthe Umbrella
Final Agreement, and also contain provisions specificto the First Nation . These
four Final Agreements are "land claims agreements".
The Umbrella Final Agreement, and therefore all four First Nation Final
Agreements, contemplated the negotiation of self-government agreements by
the Yukon First Nations. However, at the insistence of the Government of
Canada, the Umbrella Final Agreement and the four First Nation Final
Agreements provided, by paragraph 24.12.1, that self-government agreements
would not create "treaty rights" within section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982.
The four Yukon First Nations that have entered into First Nation Final
Agreements have also entered into Self-Government Agreements . The SelfGovernment Agreements are very similarto each other, being based on aModel
Agreement negotiated by the Council for Yukon Indians in 1992. The four
Agreements are given effect by self-government legislation enacted by the
Parliament of Canada and the Yukon Territorial Assembly ."
Thejurisdictional provisions of one of the Yukon Indian Self-Government
Agreements are reproduced as an appendix to this article. The jurisdictional
provisions are set out in four lists of powers to enactlaws . The firstlist (in para .
13.1) is a list oflaw-making powers thatare"exclusive"tothe FirstNation. (The
other law-making powers are concurrent. The terms exclusive and concurrent
on May 29, 1993, and all four have been published under the authority of the Minister of
Indian Affairs and Northern Development, by Supply and Services Canada, under the
above names .
23 Another example of a self-government
agreementis the Sechelt Indian Band SelfGovernment Act, S.C . 1956, c. 27. The Sechelt model was path-breaking, but it was
developedinthe pre-Charlottetown era so that its suitability in thepost-Charlottetown era
is questionable and we note that many Aboriginal peoples have expressly stated that they
do not wantthe Sechelt model.
2^ TheUmbrella Final
Agreementbetween the Government ofCanada,theCouncil for
Yukon Indians and the Government of the Yukon was signed in Whitehorse on May 29,
1993 . It is published, under the authority of the Minister ofIndian Affairs and Northern
Development, by Supply and Services Canada, 1993 .
25 Yukon FirstNations Self-GovernmentAct,
S.C . 1994, c. 35; First Nations (Yukon)
Self-Government Act, S.Y. 1993, c. 5; Settlement legislation (to give effect to the land
claims) was enacted at the same time : Yukon First Nations Land Claims Settlement Act,
S.C. 1994, c. 34; Yukon Land Claim Final Agreements Act, S.Y. 1993, c. 19.
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are explained later in this article .) The second list (in para.13 .2) is a list oflawmaking powers thatextend throughout the Yukon, but are limited to FirstNation
citizens . This is an example of "personal jurisdiction" (also explained below) .
The third list (in para. 13.3) is a list oflaw-making powers that are restricted to
the First Nation's own land; the powers apply to everyone on the land, not just
First Nation citizens. This is an example of "territorial jurisdiction" (again
explained below). The fourth list ofpowers (in para.13 .4) is a listof"emergency
powers" that confer on the First Nation certain special powers to cope with
emergencies on First Nation land.
We recognize that the details of self-government will differ radically from
one partofCanada to another . Solutions that work wellinthe sparselypopulated
Yukon may not workin the south. However, the Yukon Agreements do provide
examples of the kinds of jurisdiction which an Aboriginal government may
wish to exercise . It should be emphasized, however, that it is not coincidental
that the Yukon self-government agreements were concluded shortly after an
agreement on a comprehensive landclaims settlement. For Aboriginal peoples,
the issue ofland is central to self-government jurisdiction . We will not focus on
those connections, although it is important to emphasize that as part of the
implementation ofself-government, lands and resources issues will be pivotal
to effective government. The existing land and resource base for most First
Nations is inadequate for effective self-government and this item will require
immediate attention in the transition from the Indian Act to self-government.
A. Territorial Jurisdiction
One issue to be addressed in any self-government agreement is the extent
ofthe First Nation'spower to make laws. One model is a listofpowers confined
to the territory of the First Nation . It is obvious that every First Nation would
require extensive powers over its own land. The management of the land, the
regulation of activity on the land, including hunting, fishing, gathering, mining
and forestry, the licensing ofbusinesses, planning, zoning and building codes,
environmental protection and the administration of justice are among the
subjects that a First Nation would probably wish to regulate . These powers
would be confined to the First Nation's land." The powers would not extend to
Aboriginal people off First Nation land. However, the powers would apply to
both non-Aboriginal and Aboriginal people on First Nation land.
In the Yukon First Nation Self-Government Agreements, 27 where there are
four lists of powers, one list (in clause 13.3) is confined to the First Nation's
Settlement Land. These powers are examples of territorial jurisdiction .
"The fact that both land claims and self-government agreements were concluded in
the Yukon suggests that the resolution of land issues is closely connected to progress on
self-government jurisdiction . This is important to remember when applying the Yukon
model to other contexts.
27 Thejurisdictional provisions are reproduced in an appendix to this article .
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Personal Jurisdiction

There are otherpowers a FirstNationmight wish to exercise that should not
be confined to ]First Nation land. The First Nation may wish to provide a range
of social services to its citizens, including those who are living off FirstNation
land. Adoption, guardianship, custody and care of children cannot be confined
toFirstNationland. These issues are central to theachievement oftheobjectives
describedin the contextual statement andarrangements forpersonaljurisdiction
will be part of self-government implementation. Thus, a First Nation will
probably require a second list of powers that are applicable to First Nation
citizens on or off First Nation land. Laws enacted by a First Nation under this
list would constitute a "personal law" that followed First Nation citizens
wherever they were . These laws would not apply to non-Aboriginal people . In
the Yukon First Nation Self-Government Agreements, two of the four lists of
powers (in clauses 13.1 and 13.2) are not confined to the First Nation's
Settlement Land. They would apply to citizens of the First Nation throughout
the Yukon and are examples of personal jurisdiction.
The personal jurisdiction of an Aboriginal government, like its territorial
jurisdiction, has the capacity to be compulsory. For example, an Aboriginal
child who has been placed with a family living outside the Aboriginal territory
would not become subject to provincial or territorial law respecting his or her
custody. This would protect the child from the risk of decisions made by nonAboriginal bodies altering the arrangements put in place by Aboriginal law. ®f
course, it would be open to an Aboriginal government not to exercise the full
extent ofits personaljurisdiction, and this wouldbe determined by the political
process internal to the Aboriginal people. It should be noted that the Canadian
Charter ofRights and Freedoms would probably apply to the exercise by an
Aboriginal government of its personal (as well as its territorial) jurisdiction.
Other First Nations will require legislative powers that extend to their
citizens regardless ofresidence. Inthe Yukonexample, evenpersonaljurisdiction
was confined to the boundaries of the Yukon, and for other First Nations this
personaljurisdiction may also be confined to a province or territory, or it may
apply throughout Canada.
Aboriginal self-government could exist in urban areas of Canada in the
form of institutions which deliver services to First Nations, Inuit or Métis
citizens off Aboriginal territories. Personal jurisdiction would be essential to
these developments . A high level of coordination would be required among
various Aboriginal governments to serve their citizenry in an urban setting in
order to avoid duplication of services and enormous cost.
Personaljurisdiction will mean that Aboriginal citizens will "take the law
with them" when they leave Aboriginal territories. This is not a new concept as
it is already a part of Canadian law in family law. We have a developed body
ofprinciples on conflicts of law to govern these situations. As well, agreements
that- now exist between provinces and foreign jurisdictions respecting the
enforcement of maintenance and custody orders provide examples of the
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coordination ofdifferent legal regimes in the interests of effective governance .
Similar devices will be available to Aboriginal governments. Moreover, in the
Aboriginal context, we are already familiar with the notion of portability of
rights, such as treaty rights to education, off a territorial base . Personal
jurisdiction builds upon these pre-existing concepts to ensure that Aboriginal
governments will have effective governingpowers to enable them toaccomplish
governmental policy objectives like cultural protection in the context of child
welfare.
C. Emergency Jurisdiction
It may be desirable to provide for emergency jurisdiction over persons or
territory in a self-government agreement. The Yukon First Nation SelfGovernment Agreements (by clause 13.4) attempt to anticipate some of the
problems that could arise in an emergency as a result of the territorial and
personal restrictions on First Nations' powers . For example, a child mightbe in
danger on Settlement Land, and the First Nation's child welfare officials might
not know whether the child was a First Nation citizen. Or a child might be in
danger offSettlement Land, and itmight not be clearwhich orderofgovernment
hadjurisdiction. To enable prompt action tobe takenin these kinds of situations,
the YukonAgreements empower the First Nation to act torelieve an emergency
on Settlement Land, even if the laws of general application are applicable. A
similar power enables the Yukon Territorial Government to act to relieve an
emergency offSettlement Land even ifthe situation is governed by First Nation
law. In each case, as soon as practicable, the matter would be returned to the
correct governmental authority .
III. Exclusive and Concurrent Powers
Another issue to be addressed in the jurisdictional provisions of a selfgovernment agreement is which Aboriginal legislative powers are to be
"exclusive" and which are to be "concurrent". Exclusive powers are those
possessed only by the Aboriginal people ; neither the federal Parliament nor the
provincial (or territorial) Legislature would be able to exercise the same power .
Concurrent powers are those possessed not only by the Aboriginal people, but
also by either the federalParliament or the provincial (orterritorial) Legislature.
The disadvantage of exclusive powers is that they require the enactment of
comprehensive laws by the Aboriginal people; no other laws will be available
to fill gaps . The disadvantage of concurrent powers is that they give rise to the
possibility of inconsistent laws, one enacted by the Aboriginal people and the
otherenactedby thefederalParliamentorthe provincial (or territorial)Legislature.
Rules have to be developed to deal with inconsistency, and these are the topic
of the next section of this paper.
In the Constitution Act, 1867, the law-making powers of the federal
Parliament, and the provincial legislatures are set out in two lists, each ofwhich
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is said to be exclusive. Inpractice, however, considerable evolution and power
sharing has been permitted throughjudicial interpretation. The tendency ofthe
courts is to recognize overlap between the two lists, in other words, concurrent
powers . For example, protection of the environment is not mentioned in either
list. Nevertheless the courts have held that both orders of government possess
extensive, overlapping powers to protect the environment . The point is that
many of the law-making powers possessed by the federal Parliament and the
provincial Legislatures are concurrent .
The Yukon First Nation Self-Government Agreements (by clause 13 .1)
includeashort listofexclusivepowers . Generally speaking, thelist encompasses
therulesof indoor management oftheFirstNation's affairs, andthe administration
of rights and benefits under its land claims agreement. The otherlists, described
earlier, contain concurrent powers .
Ill . Intergovernmental Cooperation in Canada

Since 1867,thefederalandprovincial governments have exercised governmental
powers overthe same territoryandover the same people, (although the exercise
of jurisdiction by the federal and provincial governments "over" Aboriginal
peoples has been controversial) . Despite minor disputes and lawsuits, the two
orders of government have learned to live together . An extensive network of
relationships has developed at the ministerial and official levels to share
information and ideas and to coordinate policies. In many fields of concurrent
jurisdiction, formal agreements have. enabled both orders of government to
work together in pursuit of common goals.
For example, provincial health care plans and provincial social assistance
plans arefundedinpartbythefederal government under shared-cost agreements
which define the basic principles underlying both kinds of plans . Another
example is the policing agreements, under which the IZ.C .M.P. provides
policing services to eight provinces and many municipalities in return for
provincial and municipal sharing of the cost of the services . Another example
is the tax collection agreements, under which the federal government collects
provincial income taxes for nine provinces in return forprovincial agreements
to use the same tax base as the federal income tax.
Aboriginal governmentsentering this complexnetworkoffederal-provincial
relationships willfind advantages in many of the techniques of cooperation that
have been developed by the federal and provincial governments. Thus, an
Aboriginal government may enter into tax-collection agreements with another
government . An Aboriginal government may choose to "rent" the policing or
prosecutorial services of another government. There may be responsibilities
which a First Nation prefers to assume gradually, allowing services to be
rendered to First Nations citizens by another government until the First Nation
has developed the capacity or policy to deliver the services.
The lesson to be drawn from intergovernmental cooperation is that selfgovernment does not occur in a political vacuum. An Aboriginal government
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will not have toimmediately assume all the functions of a modern government.
Agreements ofvarious kinds are required to make an order of government fully
operational.Moreover, intergovernmental cooperationand sharingofjurisdiction
and resources is the norm rather than the exception in Canadian federalism.
A. Federal-Provincial Rulesfor Inconsistent Laws

A self-government agreement must deal with the relationship between
federal and provincial (or territorial) laws, and Aboriginal laws. In the federalprovincial context, conflicts between federal and provincial laws are resolved
by the rule offederal paramountcy . Thisruleis not as important asit might seem,
because the courts accept a very narrow definition ofinconsistency: only if one
law expressly contradicts the otheris there an inconsistency that triggers the rule
of federal paramountcy. If the two laws can exist side by side without
contradiction, there is no inconsistency and both laws remain operative.
Forexample, in Construction Montcalm Inc. v. Minimum Wage Commission
(Quêbec) '28 the Supreme Court of Canada held that a federal law stipulating a
minimum wage for federal contractors was not inconsistent with a provincial
law that stipulated a higher minimum wage. The Supreme Court of Canada
reasoned that thefederal law did notprohibit ahigher wage; therefore, both laws
could co-exist. The practicalresult was that the federal contractor had to pay the
higher Québec minimum wage, and could not rely on the lower federal figure .
Thus, courts will go to great lengths to uphold legislation and will be extremely
reluctant to find inconsistency if the laws can be reconciled.
There is nothing to suggest that this same approach would not be brought
to an analysis of inconsistency in the context of Aboriginal laws.
B. Displacement ofFederal and Provincial Laws

Each self-government agreement must provide for the transition to selfgovernment, so as to guard against a vacuum of laws during the initial period
before the Aboriginal government has had time to make the laws that are within
its responsibilities . This problem arose in 1867 when the Parliament of Canada
and the Legislatures of Ontario and Québec were first established. The solution
in 1867 was embodied in section 129 of the Constitution Act, 1867, which
provided that all laws in force in 1867 should continue in force until they were
repealed, abolishedor alteredby the Parliament of Canada or the Legislature of
aprovince. This provided forthe continuedexistence ofpre-confederation laws .
Although the main purpose of section 129 was transitional, some preconfederation laws have never been replaced and continue in force today.
The Charlottetown Accord borrowed from section 129 in proposing a
similar rule for the transition to self-government. The Accord provided (by
clause 47) that "federal and provincial laws will continue to applyuntil they are
28

[197911 S.C.R. 754.
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displaced by laws passed by governments of Aboriginal peoples pursuant to
their authority" . This clause would have ensured that pre-self-government laws
would continue to apply until displaced.
Such a transitional clause would not only govern the transition to selfgovernment but also have apennanent effect . Theclause would have established
an importantgeneralrule that Aboriginal laws could "displace" laws of general
application. In other words, where Aboriginal laws were inconsistent with laws
ofgeneral application, the Aboriginal law would be paramount and the law of
general application would have to yield.
The Charlottetown Accord proposed (also by clause 47) one exception to
the general rule of Aboriginal paramountcy. Where a federal or provincial law
was "essential to the preservation of peace, order, and good government in
Canada", then that law would prevail over an inconsistent Aboriginal law . The
meaning ofthis peace, order and good government exceptionhas been the topic
of some debateP and certainly this provision was the most troubling for
Aboriginal peoples. In our view, however, the exception would be given a
narrow scope by the courts, drawing by analogy on the existing jurisprudence
that has given a narrow interpretation to the words "peace, order and good
government" in section 91 of the Constitution Act, 1867. The exception would
probably cover emergency laws and laws designed to prevent injury or harm to
non-Aboriginal people or land 30 It is reasonable that laws of this category
(essential for peace, order, and good government) should apply to Aboriginal
peoples, and should not be subject to displacement by Aboriginal laws. For
example, if a province required all residents to be inoculated against an
epidemic of smallpox, Aboriginal peoples should be subject to the same
requirement as non-Aboriginal people . Indeed, no Aboriginal government
wouldwant to create health risks for Aboriginal people or their non-Aboriginal
neighbours, so these kinds of limits on Aboriginal government jurisdiction
would not be major issues from a pragmatic perspective.
The Charlottetown Accord did not define inconsistency for the purpose of
the paramountcy provisions, but silence indicates that the narrow definition
developedin the federal-provincial contextwould also applyhere. For example,
a First Nation might enact laws to regulate the discharge of waste material by
a business located on First Nation land. The same business may be subject to
controls enacted by the province. In this situation, the courts would probably
hold that there was no inconsistency between the two laws: the business would
be obliged to obey both the First Nation and the provincial rules. If the First
Nation's rules were the stricter of the two, then the First Nation would in effect
be the primary legislator.
see A. Bissonnette, "Analysepothume d'un accord mis àmort" (1993) Recherches
Amdrindiennes an Québec 80 at 83-84.
30 For a more complete
analysis of the existing peace, order, and good government
provision seeP.W. Hogg, Constitutional Lawof Canada, 3d ed. (Toronto: Carswell,1992)
ch. 17.
29
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Yukon Self-Government

The Yukon First Nation Self-Government Agreements, like the
Charlottetown Accord, provide (by clause 13 .5) that laws of general application
shall continue to apply to the First Nation, its citizens and First Nation Land. In
the event of inconsistency between a law of the First Nation and a law of the
Yukon, it is the law of the First Nation that is paramount. In the event of
inconsistency between a law of the First Nation and a federal law, the SelfGovernment Agreements are incomplete . They provide (by clause 13 .5 .2) for
afuture agreementbetween the FirstNation andCanada "which will identify the
areas in which the laws of [the First Nation] shall prevail over federal laws". No
future agreement has been entered into.31
It is an unsatisfactory feature of the Yukon Self-Government Agreements
that they do not settle the precise form of the rules of paramountcy between
federal and FirstNations laws . Ideally, alljurisdictional issues should be settled
in the self-government agreement and not postponed to some future process.
However, the provision that was included does contemplate that there will be
areas in which the laws ofthe First Nation will be paramount over federal laws.
With respect to inconsistency between a First Nation law and a Yukon law
(where the rule is First Nation paramountcy), the YukonAgreements substitute
a broader definition of inconsistency for the narrow common-law definition.
According to clause 13.5 .3 of the Yukon Agreements, a Yukon law shall be
inoperative "to the extent that it provides for any matter for which provision is
made in a law enacted by [the First Nation]" . This means that whenever a First
Nation law covers a particular field that is also occupied by Yukon law, the
Yukon law is displaced. It is not necessary to show that the two laws are
inconsistent in the narrow sense of contradictory; the mere fact that they make
provision for the samematter would cause the Yukon law to yield. The general
idea here is that once a First Nation elects to provide a particular service
(formerly provided by the Yukon) or regulate a particular activity (formerly
regulated by the Yukon), then the First Nation would become the sole provider
orregulator, requiring the Yukon Territorial Government to withdraw from the
field.

The SecheltIndian Band Self-Government Act, supra footnote 23 provides, by ss.
that federal and provincial laws of general application apply to the Band, its
members and Sechelt lands. In the case ofprovincial laws, however, the laws oftheBand
takepriority . Thus, in theevent ofinconsistency betweenaprovincial law and aBand law,
it is the Band law that is paramount. However, in the event of inconsistency between a
federal law and aBand law, itis thefederallaw that is paramount. The SecheltAct is silent
on the definition of inconsistency so that the narrow express contradiction test would
probably apply.
31

37 and 38,
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V. Administration of Justice
An Aboriginal government will require the power to enforce its own laws, and
may wish to enforce those federal and provincial (or territorial) laws that
continue to apply on Aboriginal land . The Aboriginal people will wantpolicing,
prosecutions, courts and corrections to operate so as to ensure a peaceful and
law-abiding Aboriginal community. Thepeople will also want all aspects of the
justice system to be administered with sensitivity to Aboriginal ways and
Aboriginal problems. Indeed proven discrimination against Aboriginal peoples
in the Canadian criminal justice system requires the development of new
approaches to the field and greater autonomy for Aboriginal peoples to design
and implement criminal justice measures in their communities ."
Thefederal andprovincial (orterritorial) governmentswill also be concerned
with the enforcement of their laws of general application on Aboriginal land.
Given the interests of the other two orders of government, and the limited
resources ofpersonneland funds that are availableto an Aboriginalgovernment,
it may be desirable for an Aboriginal government to exercise its power over the
administration of justice in accordance with a justice agreement entered into
with the othertwo orders of government.In that way, theAboriginal government
would gain access to services and funding that can be supplied by the other
orders of government, and all three orders of government would participate in
the construction of a regime that is compatible with their legitimate objectives .
The YukonFirstNation Self-GovernmentAgreements provide one possible
modelforthe administration ofjustice provisions . Underthose Agreements, the
First Nation has, in its catalogue of legislative powers on First Nation land
(clause 13 .3 .17), the power over "administration of justice".33 However, the
First Nation agrees (clause 13 .6 .3) not to exercise the power unilaterally for a
period of ten years. For that time, thepower can only be exercisedin accordance
with a justice agreement entered into with federal and territorial governments.
The Self-Government Agreements (clause 13 .6 .1) oblige the First Nation and
both governments to negotiate a justice agreement, and once an agreement is
negotiated the First Nation would exercise its power over the administration of
justice to give effect to the agreement. Until ajustice agreement is reached, or
if no agreement is reached, there are (in clause 13 .6 .4) interim provisions for
enforcement of First Nation laws, jurisdiction of courts and corrections . The
interim provisions are designed to be replaced by ajustice agreement, butif no
agreement is reached, the interim provisions expire at the end of the ten-year
period (clause 13 .6 .6) . At that time, the First Nation assumes full possession of
its power over the administration of justice. If at that time there is a justice
32 See the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, Report of the Roundtable on
Justice (Ottawa: The Commission, 1993).
33 The Yukon Agreements
do not recognize First Nations' jurisdiction over "criminal
law", which is now reserved exclusively to the federal government . Some First Nations
may want at least concurrent jurisdiction over criminal-law-making, as well as the
administration of justice, which now rests with provincial governments .
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agreement in force, then of course the First Nation would be bound to act in
accordance with the agreement.

Vl. Justiciability ofSelf-Government
Disputes will inevitably arise out of the interpretation, administration or
implementation of self-government agreements . Disputes will arise regarding
the scope of Aboriginal government jurisdictions and fiscal matters. Many of
these will raise legal issues, and accordingly will come within the jurisdiction
of the provincial (or territorial) or federal courts . Unless special courts are
established to addresslegalissues relating to self-government agreements, legal
conflicts will come before Canadian courts . The burden on Canadian courts is
bound to be significant and active programs for judicial education in the field
of Aboriginal and treaty rights and the recruitment of Aboriginal people for
judicial appointments are two steps which should be taken to meet the legal
challenges in the transition to self-government.
In the broader context of dispute resolution, we contemplate that the kinds
ofdisputes whichwill ariseduring this transition period will be both internaland
external to the Aboriginal community. Internal disputes are those either among
citizens of the Aboriginal communities or between citizens and Aboriginal
governments. Internal disputes may be criminal or civil (including of a family
nature) and will require community dispute resolution processes as part of the
self-government arrangement. External disputes arethosewhich involvecitizens
of the Aboriginal community and non-Aboriginal governments or Aboriginal
governments and non-Aboriginal governments. While Aboriginal peoplesmay
wish to establish justice systems to govern internal relations between their
citizens residing on theirterritories, andin some cases non-residents andvisitors
(andthe Yukon exampleis a modelhere), there is an immediate need to consider
how disputes of an external nature will be resolved .
To date, all disputes between Aboriginal peoples and governments have
been brought before the Canadian courts . As the issues become more complex
during the implementation of self-government, the Canadian courts will not be
the most efficient and cost-effective forum for dispute resolution. 34 They have
also been questioned as appropriate forums for resolving the disputes between
Aboriginal peoples and government as these disputes are intercultural and the
courts do not reflect Aboriginal culture or even an equal power relationship
94 Indeed ongoing litigation such as Delgamuukw v. Attorney General of British
Columbia (1993),104 D.L.R. (4th)470 (B .C.C.A.), which involvedover 350 trialdays and

several months ofappeal hearings withthousands of exhibits, makesitclearthat theburden
placed on the courtto deal with these claims within conventional lawis unworkable. The
CourtofAppeal in Delgamuukw expressed averystrong preference forpoliticalresolution
of Aboriginal disputes . TheSupreme Court ofCanada, which has granted leave to appeal,
has granted theparties an 18-month delayin order to encourage them to reach anegotiated
agreement.
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between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal peoples in Canadian society." We feel
that it is preferable to establish processes to facilitate the out=of courtresolution
of disputes in a non-adversarial atmosphere, using mediators, arbitrators and
advisers who are familiar with the self-government agreement and Aboriginal
practices . Disputes arising from the negotiations and the implementation of
agreements are appropriate for nonjudicial forums . Moreover, a tribunal
composed of individuals expert in the subject area could be cost-efficient,
expeditious and respectful of the different cultural and legal traditions of the
parties . Such a tribunal could be established either in a self-government
agreement or in a framework agreement which called for self-government
negotiations .
TheYukonFirstNations have setup alternative disputeresolution procedures
of mediation and negotiation in their land claims agreements . The Yukon First
Nation Self-Government Agreements, by clause 24.0, make those procedures
available for disputes arising under the Self-Government Agreements and
provide an attractive model.
While ADR mechanisms 36 can be established to assist self-government
negotiations and the implementation of self-government agreements, legal
questions will arise that will have to be resolved by the courts . It is likely that
aCanadian court, when facedwith such disputes, would approach this task with
thepurposive approach seen in Chartercases. This approach entails examining
the purpose of the transition to self-government and the need to respect
constitutionally-protected Aboriginal and treaty rights in section 35 of the
Constitution Act, 1982 . The fact that Aboriginal peoples are vulnerable in their
relations with the Crown, given that the Crown is more powerful, would also
influence the court in scrutinizing the conduct of government to ensure that its
duties as a fiduciary were fulfilled.
. Financing of ,Self-Government
For Aboriginal governments and Aboriginal jurisdictions to be meaningful,
they must have an adequate financial basis. This means that Aboriginal
governments should have the capacity to levy taxes, to borrow and to have
access to transfers from the other orders of government .
A. Taxation
The Constitution Act, 1867, which says nothing about Aboriginal
governments, confers taxation powers on the federal Parliament and the
provincial legislatures . It distinguishes between "direct" and "indirect" taxes.
" See M.E. Turpel, "Aboriginal Peoples and the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms : Interpretive Monopolies, Cultural Differences" (1989-90) 6 Can. H.R .Y.B . 3.
"An appropriate disputeresolution process would need to be aproduct of agreement
and would need to reflect Aboriginal culture and ensure Aboriginal representation.
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Direct taxes are those that are unlikely to be "passed on" by the initial payer of
the tax. Direct taxes have been held to include income taxes, property taxes and
sales taxes (provided the tax is imposed on the consumer, not the vendor).
Indirect taxes are those that tend to be passed on by the initial payer of the tax,
so that it is hard to know where they ultimately fall. Customs and excise taxes
fallinto the indirect category, because the importer or manufacturer is expected
to include the taxes in the price that he or she charges for the imported or
manufactured product, and the ultimate burden of the tax is passed on to the
consumer.
Under the Constitution Act, 1867, the provinces are generally limited to
direct taxes, the reasoning being that they should not be allowed to export the
burden oftheir taxes to the residents of other provinces; the federal Parliament,
onthe other hand, is authorized to levy both direct and indirect taxes." Because
both orders of government have the power to levy direct taxes, the taxpayer is
often in the position of having to pay taxes to two governments. In the case of
the personal income tax, the federal government hasentered into "tax collection
agreements" withnine oftheten provinces, underwhich the federalgovernment
agrees to collect the province's share ofthe tax, and the provinces agree to use
the same tax base as that of the federal tax. This relieves the taxpayer from the
need to file two returns with different information and calculations .
There is also a level of taxation at the municipal level, which is exercised
bymunicipalities underpowers delegatedto them by the provinces orterritories.
The most common municipal tax is a tax on real property in the municipality .
The obvious approach toAboriginal taxation powers wouldbeforAboriginal
peoples to possess the same power to levy "direct" taxes as the provinces. This
is not now the case with Indian Act bands, which under section 83(1)(a) of the
Indian Act have the power to levy municipal-like property taxes, subject to the
approval of the Minister of Indian Affairs . The Sechelt Indian Band SelfGovernment Act confers a power of taxation that is similar to the Indian Act
power, although there is no requirement of ministerial approval.
The Yukon First Nation Self-Government Agreements, by clause 14.0,
confer on the First Nations not only the power to levy property taxes, but also
the power tolevy otherkinds ofdirect taxes on theircitizens on Settlement Land.
However, the Agreements contemplate that the First Nations willenter into taxsharing arrangements with the Yukon Territorial Government so that there is a
sharing of tax "room" and general coordination between the tax systems ofthe
two governments . Only pursuant to these intergovernmental arrangements
wouldthe First Nations acquirethepowerto levy taxes other than property taxes
on non-Aboriginal people and corporations on Settlement Land. Yukon taxsharing agreements have not yet been entered into, but they could, for example,
providefor asingle tax-collection agency for both Yukon andFirst Nation taxes,
and agreements as to therates oftaxthat each government would impose, sothat
37

Constitution Act, 1867, (U .K .) 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, ss . 91(3), 92(2).
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the tax-filing obligations and the total burden of taxation were reasonable and
predictable."
Transfer Payments

Even with fullpowers ofdirect taxation, mostAboriginal communities lack
the tax base thatwould enable them to raise enough revenue to provide services
at a level that is appropriate for Canadian citizens. This is also true ofthe "have
not" provinces and both the territories, all of which are net beneficiaries of
federal transfer payments . Section 36(2) of the Constitution Act, 1982 provides
as follows :
Parliament and the government of Canada are committed to the principle of making
equalization payments to ensurethatprovincial governments have sufficientrevenues
to provide reasonably comparable levels ofpublic services atreasonably comparable
levels of taxation.
This provision sets a standard forfederal transfer payments to the provinces, but
it says nothing about the territories or about Aboriginal governments.
In the discussions leading to the Charlottetown Accord, the Aboriginal
organizations were unsuccessful in their efforts to secure an amendment to
section 36(2) to extend it to Aboriginal governments . Instead, the Accord (by
clause 50) provided that the financing of self-government was to be dealt with
in a later "political accord" . That political accord would "commit federal and
provincial governments to the principle of providing the governments of
Aboriginal peoples with fiscal or other resources, such as land, to assist those
governments to govern their own affairs" . The Charlottetown Accord (still in
clause 50) explicitly required that Aboriginal governments had tobe capable of
"providing essential public services at levels reasonably comparable to those
available to other Canadians in the vicinity" . The Charlottetown Accord thus
39
Under the Indian Act, 1t.S .C . 1985, c .1-6, s . 87 there is an exemption from federal
and provincial taxes for "the personal property of an Indian orband situated on areserve" .
Section 87 has been held to provide an exemption from sales taxes and income taxes for
status Indians . The exemption is confined to reserves, and this has led to legal decisions
attemptingto definethenatureoftheconnection withareserve thatis neededto qualify for
the exemption . Section 87 applies only to federal and provincial (or territorial) taxes, and
would not preclude a First Nation from levying taxes on status Indians on reserves.
The four Yukon First Nations who have concluded land claims agreements have
decided to give up the section 87 exemption (Council for Yukon Indians, UmbrellaFinal
Agreement, 1993, cl . 20.6), inreturn for acapital sum thatconstitutes compensation for the
loss ofthe exemption. Thebuy-out ofthe exemption is delayed forthree years to give the
First Nation time to get ready for the introduction of taxes.
Section 87 provides a tax exemption for an Indian Act band, as well as for
individuals . It goes without saying that, under self-government, the First Nation itself and
its corporations should continue to be exempt from federal and provincial taxes . This is
providedforinthe Sechelt Indian Band Self- GovernmentAct, s . 35, and inthe Yukon First
Nation Self-Government Agreements, cl. 15.0 .
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essentially accepted the principle that transfer payments to Aboriginal
governments should be sufficient to enable those governments toprovide public
services ofsimilarquality to those provided by otherlevels ofgovernment . This
standard should be reflected in financing agreements with Aboriginal peoples.
C. Yukon Example
The Yukon First Nation Self-Government Agreements, whose terms were
settledbefore the Charlottetown Accord, by clause 16.0, oblige Canada to enter
into a "self-government financial transfer agreement" with each First Nation
"with the objective ofproviding [the FirstNation] with resources to enable [the
FirstNation] toprovide public services atlevels reasonably comparable to those
generallyprevailing in the Yukon, atreasonably comparable levels oftaxation".
The language used borrows from section 36(2) of the Constitution Act, 1982,
and the reference to Yukon (along with other provisions, notably clause 16.4.4)
points the negotiators to the formula used for financing the Yukon Territorial
Government. Some of the financing of First Nation Governments would
inevitably come out ofexisting transfers to the Yukon Territorial Government
in recognition that services had been shifted from the Yukon to the First Nation.
But the Self-Government Agreements, by clause 18.1, provide that a decrease
in federal funding to the Yukon must not be so severe as to cause anyreduction
in the level or quality of Yukon services to non-Aboriginal Yukon residents.
The Yukon First Nation Self-Government Agreements make provision (by
clause 24) for a failure to agree upon the terms of the self-government financial
transferagreement. In that event, either partymay refer thematter to amediation
process that is provided forin theland claims agreement; ifmediation fails, then
the matter can be referred by the parties to an arbitration process that is also
provided for in the land claims agreement.
Whilejurisdictional issues must be settled in aself-government agreement,
it is only the adequate financing of self-government that guarantees that an
Aboriginal government will become operational. The Yukon model suggests
one route and certainly a combination of taxing powers and transfer payments
is required to fully implement the inherent right of self-government.
VIII . Status of Self-Government Agreements
A. Protectionfrom Unilateral Alteration
TheCharlottetown Accord contemplated (in clause 46) that self-government
agreements would create treaty rights that would be constitutionally protected
by section 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982 . Through section 35(1), as well
as the express recognition of the inherent right, Aboriginal self-government
would have been a constitutionally-protected "order of government" within the
Canadian federation. The failure of the Charlottetown Accord means that these
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provisions are not in the Constitution. Under the present Constitution, without
the Charlottetown amendments, what is the status of self-government
agreements?,
A self-government agreement that was part of a "land claims agreement"
would be protected under section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982 . A selfgovernment agreement that was not part of a land claims agreement would, at
least if it contained no language to the contrary, be a modern "treaty" which
would alsobe protectedundersection35 ofthe ConstitutionAct,1982 . Itis clear
that "an exchange of solemn promises" is a treaty, even ifno cession of landis
involved." It is also clear from subsection (3) of section 35 that the section
applies to post-1982 treaties ; the reference in subsection (3) to "land claims
agreements" would not exclude other kinds of modern treaties . It follows that
a self-government agreementwould create treaty rights thatwouldbe protected
by section 35. This would meanthat an attempt by the Parliament of Canada or
a provincial (or territorial) Legislature to alter the terms of a self-government
agreement, without the consent of the affected First Nation, would be struck
down by the courts .
The present policy of the Government of Canada is to deny treaty status to
self-government agreements . This policy is inconsistent with an effective
transition to self-government and should be rethought. The Yukon First Nation
Final Agreements provide that the Self-Government Agreements are not to be
regarded as creating treaty rights that are protected by section 35 . The federal
government's policy pre-dates the Charlottetown Accord, and reflects a hope
that the constitutional status of Aboriginal self-governmentcould be dealt with
in a comprehensive constitutional amendment. The failure of the Accord
removes the reason for the Government's policy and should lead to its reversal.
The policy of denying treaty status to self-government agreements has been
implemented by a clause in self-government agreements (or, as in the Yukon
case,in alandclaims agreement that includes orcontemplates aself-government
agreement) underwhich Government and the First Nation concerned agreethat
the self-government agreement is not to create treaty rights within the meaning
of section 35. This kind of clause is considered effective in denying such
agreements treaty status under section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982.
A self-government agreement that has, by express agreement, been denied
the status of a treaty may nevertheless be constitutionally protected. This is
because section 35 protects "aboriginal" as well as "treaty" rights, and the
inherent right of self-government is an Aboriginal right. The self-government
agreements can be regarded as giving form and structure to the Aboriginal right
of self-government. The agreements do not create the right, which is inherent.
The agreements are necessary, because in the twentieth century Aboriginal
governments have to co-exist with federal and provincial (or territorial)
governments; the agreements settle mutually acceptable rules to govern the
relationship between thethree orders ofgovernment . Itis still thecase that when
19 Simon v . The Queen, [1985] 2 S .C .R . 387 .
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a First Nation passes laws and exercises other powers of self-government it is
exercising an inherent power of self-government thatis protected by section 35
of the Constitution Act, 1982 . If this is so, then any attempt by the Parliament
ofCanada oraprovincial (or territorial) Legislature to change the terms ofaselfgovernment agreement without the consent ofthe affected First Nation would
be struck down by the courts .
Our conclusion is that a self-government agreement that has, by express
agreement, been denied the status of a treaty may still be constitutionally
protected under section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982 as an expression of
Aboriginal rights. This is another reason why the federal government should
reconsider its policy of denying treaty status to self-government agreements .
There is no point in denying treaty status to the agreements if the right of selfgovernment is constitutionally protected anyway. Of course, the federal
preference for a general constitutional amendment respecting self-government,
which seemed to have beenachieved at Charlottetown, is probably now beyond
reach. Accordingly, the best course is to accord treaty status to self-government
agreements. That provides the aboriginal order of government with secure
constitutional protection under section 35 . This would mean that changes in a
self-government agreement could not be made by the unilateral action of the
federal Parliament' but would have to be made by the amending procedures set
out in the agreement, which would obviously involve the consent ofthe FirstNation.
B. Application to Third Parties
Where Aboriginal self-government enjoys the constitutional protection of
section 35, either because it is based on a treaty, or because it is an exercise of
an aboriginal right, it is still desirable that legislation be enacted, certainly by
theParliament ofCanada, andperhaps by theprovincial (orterritorial) Legislature
as well, to implement the underlying self-government agreement . This is also
true ofland claims agreements.41 The pointoflegislation is to make certain that
the self-government agreement (andtherefore all the powers ofAboriginal selfgovernment) is binding on third parties. In the absence of legislation, a nonAboriginal person or corporation to whom an Aboriginal law applied might be
successful in arguing that he or she or it was not bound by the Aboriginal law,
because he or she or it was not a party to the agreement that defined the scope
of the Aboriginal government's power to make the law. The enactment of a
statute precludes this line of argument, because a statute is obviously binding
on non-Aboriginal and (subject to section 35) Aboriginal people alike.1
4° Without constitutionalprotection anintergovernmental agreement can beunilaterally
altered by the federal Parliament: Re Canada Assistance Plan, [1991] 2 S.C .R . 525 .
4'
A.R. Thompson, "Land Claim Settlements in Northern Canada" (1991) 55 Sask. L.
Rev. 127 .
42 The Yukon First Nation Self-GovernmentAgreements (as well as the Yukon land
claims agreements) havebeen implemented byfederal and territorial legislation: see supra
footnote 25 .
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IX. Limitations on Aboriginal Governments
Like other modern governments, Aboriginal governments are subject to a
variety of limitations. The limits are external and internal. In the external
category is the Charter and international human rights standards. Internal
limitations are those imposed by Aboriginal peoples' own constitutions and
laws, providing for checks andbalances on Aboriginal governments including
financial control and accountability procedures and standards for conflicts of
interests and ethics of public officials . While these internal procedures may be
"foreign" to Aboriginal cultures, the values of public duty andresponsibility are
integral to good government, especially in a period of transition away from the
Indian Act. In a contemporary government context, measures to deal with
financial accountability and conflicts of interest are cornerstones of responsible
and accountable government .'
A. Canadian Charter ofRights and Freedoms
Aboriginal leaders, and particularly the First Nations, leadership, have
expressed reservations about the application of the Charter to Aboriginal
governments. The reasons are twofold . First, the Charter was developed
without the involvement or consent of Aboriginal peoples and does not accord
with Aboriginal culture, values and traditions . Second, the Charter calls for an
adversarial approach to theresolution ofrights conflicts before Canadian courts
and there is a concern that this confrontational mode will undermine Aboriginal
approaches to conflict resolution. On the other side of the issue, Aboriginal
women's organizations, such as the Native Women's Association of Canada,
haveinsisted that the Charterapplyto all Aboriginal governments to ensure that
human rights standards are respected.
Although there is no consensus on the issue, many Aboriginal people see
the application of the Charter as simply inappropriate, because it does not
reflect Aboriginal values or approaches to resolving disputes . This is not to say
that Aboriginal peoples have no concern for individual rights and individual
security under Aboriginal governments. The concern rests more with the
Charter's elevation ofthe guaranteed legal rights over unguaranteed social and
economic rights, the emphasis on rights rather than responsibilities, the failure
to emphasize collective rights, and the litigation model of enforcement. These
are among the features of the Charter that are alien to many Aboriginal
communities. The solution might be the development of an Aboriginal Charter
(or Charters) of Rights which could exist alongside the Canadian Charter.
a3 Itis worthnoting that in the United States many tribes have laws and procedures for
addressing alleged conflicts of interests on the part ofpublic office holders. The Navajo
Nation has an Office of Conflicts and Ethics in Government which actually hears
complaints by members ofthetribe and provides direct redress for violation of the Navajo
Code ofEthics.
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B. Section 32
The extent to which Aboriginal self-government is constrained by the
Charter is not clear. Section 32 of the Charter provides that it applies to "the
Parliament and government of Canada" and "the legislature and government of
each province". TheSupreme Court of Canada has held that this is an exhaustive
statement of the bodies that are bound by the Charter.' Section 32 does not
contemplate the existence of an Aboriginal order of government . Thus the
CharlottetownAccord DraftLegalText (by section27)proposed the amendment
of section 32 in order to make it include an express statement that the Charter
also applied to "all legislative bodies and governments of the Aboriginal
peoples of Canada".
Despite the silence of section 32 on Aboriginal governments, it is probable
that a court wouldhold that Aboriginal governments areboundby the Charter.4 s
This would be so where self-government institutions have been created by
statute, because the Charter applies to all bodies exercising statutory powers . 46
Where self-government institutions have been created by an Aboriginal people
and empowered by a self-government agreement, the source of the selfgovernment powers is probably a treaty right(ifthe self-government agreement
has treaty status) or an aboriginal right (the inherent right of self-government)
or both. Even here, the self-government agreement requires the aid of a statute
to make clear that the agreement is binding on third parties. The statute
implementing the self-government agreementprobably constitutes a sufficient
involvement by the Parliament of Canada to make the Charter applicable .
C. Section 25
Assuming that the Charter is applicable to Aboriginal governments, we
must consider the effect of section 25 of the Charter. Section 25 provides that
the Charter is not to be construed "so as to abrogate or derogate from any
aboriginal, treaty or other rights or freedoms that pertain to the aboriginal
peoples of Canada". The main purpose of section 25 is to make clear that the
prohibition of racial discrimination in section 15 of the Charter is not to be
interpreted as abrogating aboriginal or treaty rights that are possessed by a class
of people defined by culture or race. It is, therefore, designed as ashield to guard
against diminishing aboriginal and treaty rights in situations where nonAboriginal peoples might challenge the special status and rights of Aboriginal
peoples as contrary to equality guarantees . However, because Aboriginal
governments were not contemplated by the drafters of the Charter, it is unclear
°° R.W.D.S.U. v. Dolphin Delivery, [1986) 2 S.C .R. 573.
4s
Contra: K. McNeil, "Aboriginal Government and the Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms : A Legal Perspective", paper prepared for the Royal Commission on
Aboriginal Peoples, 1994 [unpublished] on file with the authors.
46
Hogg, supra footnote 30, s. 34 .2(b).

1995)

Implementing Aboriginal Self-Government

21 5

how section 25 might be interpreted to exempt the exercise of Aboriginal selfgovernment from the Charter.
We believe that it is unlikely that a court would regard section 25 as
providing a blanket immunity from the Charter to Aboriginal governments,
even though the governments were exercising powers of self-government
derived from atreaty or from an aboriginal right (the inherent right) . However,
it is likely that some actions of Aboriginal governments would be exempt from
the Charter by virtue of section 25 and that the Charter wouldbe interpreted in
a manner deferential to Aboriginal culture. Immunity from Charter application
might occur where an Aboriginal government has takenmeasures to implement
or self-regulate aboriginal or treaty rights of harvesting, hunting, fishing or the
management of Aboriginal lands and resources. In that case, the Aboriginal
government is invoking not only a right of governance, but also another
aboriginal or treaty right.
Interpretationsof the Charterwhichareconsistent with Aboriginal cultures
and traditions would probably be found when the court is faced with a situation
where differentstandards applyand the difference is integral to culturally-based
policy within an Aboriginal community. For example, if an aboriginal juvenile
justice system was created in which legal counsel is not provided to an
"accused" person, wouldthis be considered unconstitutional as denying a legal
right to an accused person? If the juvenile justice system was reflecting
Aboriginal culture and traditions, section 25 would shield such practices from
attack based on the values expressed in the legal rights provisions of the
Charter. In other words, the legal rights provisions would be given a new
interpretation in light of Aboriginal traditions .
The point here is that the application of the Charter, when viewed with
section 25, should not mean that Aboriginal governments must follow the
policies and emulate the style of government of the federal and provincial
governments. Section25 allows an Aboriginal government to design programs
and laws which are different, for legitimate cultural reasons, and have these
reasons considered as relevant should such differences invite judicial review
under the Charter. Section 25 would allow Aboriginal governments to protect,
preserve and promote the identity of their citizens through unique institutions,
norms and government practices .
D. Aboriginal Charters ofRights
The uncertainties that have been described in the application of the Charter
to Aboriginal governments would be diminished by the development of
Aboriginal Charters of Rights . Because ofthe cultural differences of Aboriginal
communities and the need to break out of the tradition of imposed legal norms
and instruments, restrictions on the powers of Aboriginal governments should
be defined by Aboriginal peoples themselves . There has been some discussion
among Aboriginal peoples of the development of Aboriginal Charters of Rights
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that would either displace the Canadian Charter or exist alongside the Canadian
Charter in its application to Aboriginal governments .
It is only realistic to recognize that a single Aboriginal Charter would be
very difficult to develop, given the diversity of Aboriginal peoples . A number
of Aboriginal Charters is more likelythan a single one . Nor should we forget the
difficulty (or perhaps impossibility) of securing the amendment of the
Constitution of Canada that would be required to displace the Canadian
Charter. These realities lead us torecommend that each First Nation, M6tis and
Inuit group should develop its own human rights provisions as part of its own
constitution . Such provisions would afford protection for those human rights
that each community regarded as paramount and could also provide for
procedures to reconcile human rights disputes when they arise. In the absence
ofa constitutional amendment, these provisions could not displace the Charter,
but would be recognised by the courts, who would then bemorelikely (invoking
section 25) to respect the laws and decisions that had been made by an
Aboriginal government within the framework of its constitution .
Conclusion
Cooperation, imagination and political will are needed to make progress in the
achievement of Aboriginal self-government. We believe there are very few
constitutional impediments to the achievement of Aboriginal self-government
in Canadian constitutional law . Section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982
providesthe base upon which Aboriginal peoples and governmentcanconstruct
self-government agreements and invest the agreements with constitutional
status .
There are many important inducements to proceeding with the
implementation of Aboriginal self-government in Canada. The litigation o£
matters of self-government is open-ended and the outcomes are unpredictable .
The legal issues are complex and legal proceedings are lengthy and costly .47
Moreover, the outcome oflitigation is usually more negotiation, as courts have
never imposed an agreement on the parties, and perhaps could not because of
the nature ofthirdparty interests in some ofthe litigation. It is clearly in the best
interests of all parties to come to a negotiation table where an agreement can be
reached based on reasoning broader than that permitted by legal doctrine and
constitutional remedies. Such an agreement provides the certainty that is so
conspicuously lacking in the general law ofaboriginal rights . The achievement
of self-government agreements requires significant change in government
policy and new priorities directed at rebuilding the relationships between the
federal governmentandAboriginal peoples, along with provincial andterritorial
governments .48
The Delgamuukw litigation, described in footnote 34, supra, is a case in point.
Perhaps with the platform of the Liberal Party ofCanada, supra footnote 4, we will
see this kind of new direction . The platform recognizes the inherent right of selfgovernment, although it does not detail an implementation plan or process. The Liberal
47
48
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Many specific Aboriginal policies need to be reconsidered by government
in orderto facilitate a successfulnegotiationprocess. Some policies whichwere
part ofgovernment approaches to Aboriginal peoples priorto the Charlottetown
Accord need to bere-evaluated and possibly abandonedinfavour ofapproaches
more consistent withthe commitment to implementing an inherent right ofselfgovernment. The Yukonexample is worthevaluating carefullynotonly interms
of its creative approaches to jurisdiction and financing but also in terms of
problems like the absence of treaty protection of rights in the agreements .
Our conclusions may be summarized as follows:
1.
The defeat ofthe Charlottetown Accord should notbe permittedto halt
the movement toward the implementation of Aboriginal self-government.
Indeed, the consensus at Charlottetown on the nature of the inherent right and
the process to invigorate it should encouragethemovement to self-government.
2.
Many of the terms of the Charlottetown Accord, and certainly the
recognition oftheinherent right and thecontextual statement; couldbe included
in a political accord between governments and Aboriginal organizations that
could form the framework for specific self-government negotiations . This
framework couldbe comprehensive for all Aboriginal peoples or couldinvolve
separate frameworks forTreaty FirstNations andnon-treatyAboriginal peoples.
3.
Self-government should be implemented by self-government
agreementsbetween governments and FirstNations. Agreements will avoidthe
need for unilateral initiatives by Aboriginal peoples, which would be bound to
lead to disputes and litigation with unpredictable outcomes. .
4.
Self-government agreements should include agreed-upon lists of the
powers that are suitable andrequired forgovernance forthe particular Aboriginal
people . Some powers may be exclusive and others concurrent. Some powers
may be based on a "personal" jurisdiction over a particular Aboriginal people,
others may be basedon a "territorial"jurisdiction over the Aboriginal people's
territory. Emergency jurisdiction may also be needed.
5.
Self-government agreements must include transitional provisions for
the application of laws of general application during the start-up period before
an Aboriginal people has enactedthe laws and assumed the responsibilities that
are contemplated by its agreement.
Government that was elected in 1993 on this platform has not yet (in 1995) taken steps to
implement the inherent right by introducing a national policy. On December 7, 1994, the
Minister ofIndian Affairs concluded a framework agreement with the Chiefs ofManitoba
on thedismantlingoftheDepartment ofIndian Affairs and Northern Developmentandthe
recognition of First Nations governments in that province. While the Framework
Agreement includes generallanguage on theinherent right and restoration ofjurisdiction,
at the timeofwriting, little progress hasbeen made in implementing the policy objectives .
This Agreement deserves closer analysis once it is clear whether it will guide changes in
Manitoba or be supplanted by a new national policy .
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Self-government agreements must include provisions to resolve the
6.
inconsistencies between the laws of the Aboriginal people and the laws of
general application. These provisions would stipulate what kinds of laws took
priority in a situation of conflict .
Self-government agreements may include provisions for coordination
7.
between the policies of the Aboriginal people and those of the federal or
provincial (or territorial) governments in fields of concurrent jurisdiction . The
administration of justice and taxation are two of the areas where a sharing of
resources and agreement on common policies are likely to be advantageous to
Aboriginal peoples.
Self-government agreements should confer jurisdiction on the courts
8.
to settle questions oflaw arising outofthe interpretationor administration of the
agreements . Agreements, including a framework agreement, should establish
alternative dispute resolution procedures for resolving disputes on issues of
process and implementation of the right of self-government.
9.
Self-government agreements must make secure provision for the
financing of self-government by taxation and transfers from other orders of
government .
10.
Self-government agreements should be constitutionally protected so
that they are not vulnerable to alteration by the unilateral action of the federal
Parliament or a provincial Legislature. This does not require an amendment of
the Constitution, because a self-government agreement can be a modern treaty
within the protection of section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982. The federal
government's policy of denying treaty status to self-government agreements
should now be reversed .
Self-governmentagreements, even if constitutionally protected, should
11.
still be implementedbyfederal andperhaps provincial (orterritorial) legislation
to make sure that the terms of the agreements are binding on third parties who
were not parties to the agreement.
The Charter probably applies to Aboriginal government, but would
12.
probably be interpreted as permitting Aboriginal peoples to pursue culturallybased policies that are respectful ofindividual rights but which differ from the
practices of federal or provincial governments.
13.
All Aboriginal peoples will have to adopt constitutions setting up the
institutions that will exercise thepowersofself-government. Thoseconstitutions
could include a Charter of Rights that is considered to be appropriate to the
values and aspirations oftheparticular Aboriginal people. Any such Aboriginal
Charter would need the support of the Aboriginal people and it could be
interpreted alongside the Canadian Charter, although it would not replace the
Canadian Charter.
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APPEND
EXAMPLE FROM YUKON SELF-GOVERNMENT
AGREEMENTS :
THE TESLIN TLINGIT COUNCIL
SELF-GOVERNMENT AGREEMENT
ART

TESLIN TLINGIT COUNCIL LECISLATI N
13.0

13.1

Legislative Powers

The Teslin Tlingit Council shall have the exclusive power to enact
laws in relation to the following matters:
13.1.1 administration of Teslin Tlingit Council affairs and operation
and internal management of the Teslin Tlingit Council;
13 .1 .2 management and administration of rights or benefits which
are realized pursuant to the Final Agreement by persons
enrolled under the Final Agreement, and which are to be
controlled by the Teslin Tlingit Council; and
13.1.3 matters ancillary to the foregoing.
13.2 The Teslin Tlingit Council shall have the power to enact laws in
relation to the following matters in the Yukon:
13.2.1 provision of programs and services for Citizens inrelation to
their spiritual and cultural beliefs and practices;
13.2.2 provision of programs and services for Citizens in relation to
their aboriginal languages ;
13.2.3 provision of health care and services to Citizens, except
licensing and regulation of facility-based services off
Settlement Land;
13 .2.4 provision of social and welfare services to Citizens, except
licensing and regulation of facility-based services off
Settlement Land;
13.2.5 provision of training programs for Citizens, subject to
Government certification requirements where applicable ;
13 .2.6 adoption by and of Citizens ;
13 .2.7 guardianship, custody, care and placement of Teslin Tlingit
children, except licensing and regulation of facility-based
services off Settlement Land;
13.2.8 provision of education programs and services for Citizens
choosing to participate, except licensing and regulation of
facility-based services off Settlement Land;
.9
13 .2
inheritance, wills, intestacy and administration of estates of
Citizens, including rights and interests in Settlement Land;
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13.2.10 procedures consistent with theprinciples ofnaturaljusticefor
determining the mental competency or ability of Citizens,
including administration of the rights and interests of those
found incapable of responsibility for their own affairs;
13.2.11 provision of services to Citizens for resolution of disputes
outside the courts ;
13.2.12 solemnization of marriage of Citizens ;
13.2.13 licences in respect of matters enumerated in 13.1, 13 .2 and
13.3 in order to raise revenue for Teslin Tlingit Council
purposes;
13 .2.14 matters necessary to enable the Teslin Tlingit Councilto fulfil
its responsibilities under the Final Agreement or this
Agreement ; and
13 .2.15 matters ancillary to the foregoing
13 .3 The Teslin Tlingit Council shall have the power to enact laws of a
localorprivate nature on Settlement Land inrelation tothe following
matters:
13.3 .1 use, management, administration, control and protection of
Settlement Land;
13.3 .2 allocation or disposition of rights and interests in and to
Settlement Land, including expropriation by the Teslin Tlingit
Council for Teslin Tlingit Council purposes ;
13.3.3 use, management, administration and protection of natural
resources under the ownership, control or jurisdiction of the
Teslin Tlingit Council;
13.3.4 gathering, hunting, trapping or fishing and the protection of
fish, wildlife and habitat;
13.3.5 control orprohibition f the erection and placement of posters,
advertising signs, and billboards ;
13.3.6 licensing and regulation of any person or entity carrying on
any business, trade, profession, or other occupation ;
13.3.7 control or prohibition of public games, sports, races, athletic
contests and other amusements ;
13.3.8 control ofthe construction, maintenance, repair and demolition
of buildings or other structures ;
13.3.9 prevention of overcrowding of residences or other buildings
or structures ;
13.3.10 control of the sanitary condition of buildings or property ;
13.3.11 planning, zoning and land development;
13.3.12 curfews, prevention of disorderly conduct and control or
prohibition of nuisances;
13.3.13 control or prohibition of the operation and use of vehicles ;
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13.3.14 control or prohibition of the transport, sale, exchange,
manufacture, supply, possession or consumption ofintoxicants;
13.3.15 establishment, maintenance, provision, operationorregulation
of local services and facilities ;
13.3.16 caring and keeping of livestock, poultry, pets and other birds
and animals, and impoundment and disposal of any bird or
animal maltreated or improperly at-large, but the caring and
keeping of livestock does not include game farming or game
ranching ;
13.3.17 administration of justice;
13.3.18 controlorprohibitionof anyactions, activitiesorundertakings
that constitute or may constitute, athreat topublic order, peace
or safety;
13 .3.19 control or prohibition of any activities, conditions or
undertakings that constitute, or may constitute, a danger to
public health ;
13.3.20 control or prevention of pollution and protection of the
environment;
13 .3.21 control or prohibition of the possession or use of firearms,
other weapons and explosives ;
13.3.22 controlorprohibitionofthetransport ofdangerous substances;
and
13 .3.23 matters coming within the good government of Citizens on
Settlement Land.
13.4.0 Emergency Powers
13 .4.1 Off Settlement Land, in relation to those matters enumerated
in 13.2, in any situation that poses an ]Emergency to a Citizen,
Government may exercise powerconferredbyLaws ofGeneral
Application to relieve the Emergency, notwithstanding that
laws enacted by the Teslin Tlingit Council may apply to the
Emergency.
13.4.2 A person acting pursuant to 13.4.1 shall, as soon aspracticable
after determining that a person in an Emergency is a Citizen,
notify the Teslin Tlingit Council of the action taken and
transfer the matter to the responsible Teslin Tlingit Council
authority, at which time the authority oftheGovernment to act
pursuant to 13 .4.1 shall cease.
13.4.3 A person actingpursuant to 13.4.1 is notliable for any act done
in good faithinthereasonable belief that the act was necessary
to relieve an Emergency .
13.4.4 On Settlement Land, in relation to those matters enumerated
in 13 .2; in any situation that poses an Emergency to a person
who is not a Citizen, the Teslin Tlingit Council may exercise
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power conferred bylaws enacted by theTeslin TlingitCouncil
to relievetheEmergency,notwithstanding thatLaws ofGeneral
Application may apply to the Emergency.
13.4.5 A person acting pursuantto 13.4.4 shall, as soon aspracticable
after determining that a person in an Emergency is not a
Citizen, notify Government or, where the person in an
Emergency is a citizen of another Yukon First Nation, that
Yukon First Nation, ofthe action taken and transfer the matter
to the responsible authority, at which time the authority ofthe
Teslin Tlingit Council to act pursuant to 13.4.4 shall cease.
13.4.6 A person acting pursuantto 13.4.4 is not liable forany actdone
in good faith in the reasonable belief that the actwas necessary
to relieve an Emergency.
13.4.7 Notwithstanding 13.5.0, in relation to powers enumerated in
13 .3, Laws of General Application shall apply with respect to
an Emergency arising on Settlement Land which has or is
likely to have an effect off Settlement Land.
13.5 .0 Laws ofGeneral Application
13 .5.1 Unless otherwise provided in this Agreement, all Laws of
General Application shall continue to apply to the Teslin
Tlingit Council, its Citizens and Settlement Land.
13.5.2 Canada and the Teslin Tlingit Council shall enter into
negotiations with aview to concluding, as soon aspracticable,
a separate agreement or an amendment of this Agreement
which will identify the areas in which laws of the Teslin
Tlingit Council shall prevail over federal Laws of General
Application to the extent of any inconsistency or conflict.
13 .5 .2.1 Canada shall Consult with the Yukon prior to
concluding the negotiations described in 13.5 .2 .
13 .5 .2.2 Clause 13.5.2 shall not affect the status of the Yukon
as a party to the negotiations or agreements referred
to in 13 .6.0 or 17.0.
13 .5 .3 Except as provided in 14.0, a Yukon Law of General
Application shall be inoperative to the extent that it provides
for any matter for which provision is made in a law enacted by
the Teslin Tlingit Council.
13 .5 .4 Where the Yukon reasonably foresees that a Yukon Law of
General Application which it intends to enact may have an
impact on a law enacted by the Teslin Tlingit Council, the
Yukon shall Consult with the Teslin Tlingit Council before
introducing the Legislation in the Legislative Assembly .
13 .5 .5 Where the Teslin Tlingit Council reasonably foresees that a
law which it intends to enact may have an impact on a Yukon
Law of General Application, the Teslin Tlingit Council shall
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Consult with the Yukon before enacting the law.
13.5.6 Where the Commissioner in Executive Council is of the
opinion that a law enacted by the Teslin Tlingit Council has
rendered a Yukon Law of General Application partially
inoperative and that it would unreasonably alter the character
of a Yukon Law of General Application or that itwould make
it unduly difficult to administer that Yukon Law of General
Application in relation to the Teslin Tlingit Council, Citizens
or Settlement Land, the Commissioner in Executive Council
may declare that the Yukon Law of General Application
ceases to apply in whole or in part to the Teslin Tlingit
Council, Citizens or Settlement Land.
13 .5.7 Prior to making a declaration pursuant to 13 .5.6, the Yukon
shall:
13.5.7.1 Consult with the Teslin Tlingit Council and identify
solutions, including any amendments to Yukon
Legislation, that theYukon considers wouldmeet the
objectives of the Teslin Tlingit Council; and
13 .5 .7.2 after Consultation pursuant to 13.5 .7 .1, where the
Yukon and the Teslin Tlingit Council agree that the
Yukon Law of General Application should be
amended, the Yukon shall propose such amendment
to the Legislative Assembly within a reasonable
period of time.
13 .6.0 Administration of Justice
13.6.1 The Parties shall enter into negotiations with a view to
concluding an agreement in respect of the administration of
Teslin Tlingit Counciljustice provided for in 13.3 .17.
13.6.2 Negotiations respecting the administration of justice shall
deal withsuch mattersas adjudication, civilremedies, punitive
sanctions including fine, penalty and imprisonment for
enforcing any law of the Teslin Tlingit Council, prosecution,
corrections, law enforcement, the relation ofany TeslinTlingit
Council courts to other courts and any other matter related to
aboriginal justice to which the Parties agree.
13.6.3 NotwithstandinganythinginthisAgreement, theTeslin Tlingit
Council shall not exercise its power pursuant to 13.3.17 until
theexpiry of the time describedin 13.6.6, unless anagreement
is reached by the Parties pursuant to 13.6.1 and 13.6.2.
13.6.4 Until theexpiry ofthetime describedin 13.6.6or an agreement
is entered into pursuant to 13 .6.1 and 13.6.2:
13.6.4.1 the Teslin Tlingit Council shall have the power to
establish penalties of fines up to $5,000 and
imprisonment to a maximum of six months for the
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violation of a law enacted by the Teslin Tlingit
Council;
13.6.4.2 the Supreme Court of the Yukon Territory, the
Territorial Court of Yukon, and the Justice of the
Peace Court shall have jurisdiction throughout the
Yukon to adjudicate in respect of laws enactedby the
Teslin Tlingit Council in accordance with the
jurisdiction designated to thosecourts by Yukon Law
except that any offence created under a law enacted
by the Teslin Tlingit Council shall be within the
exclusiveoriginal jurisdiction oftheTerritorial Court
of the Yukon;
13.6.4.3 any offence createdunder a law enactedby theTeslin
Tlingit Council shall be prosecuted as an offence
against an enactment pursuant to the Summary
Convictions Act, R .S.Y. 1986, c. 164 by prosecutors
appointed by the Yukon; and
13.6.4.4 any term ofimprisonment ordered by the Territorial
Court of the Yukon pursuant to 13 .6.4.1 shall be
served in a correctional facility pursuant to the
Corrections Act, R.S.Y ., 1986, c. 36 .
13.6.5 Nothing in 13.6.4 is intended to preclude :
13.6.5.1 consensual or existing customary practices of the
Teslin Tlingit Council with respect to the
administration ofjustice; or
13.6 .5 .2 programs and practicesinrespectofthe administration
of justice, including alternate sentencing or other
appropriate remedies, to which the Parties agree
before an agreement is concluded pursuant to 13.6.1
and 13.6.2 .
13.6.6 The provisions in 13.6.4 are interim provisions and shall
expire five years from the Effective Date or on the effective
date of the agreement concluded pursuant to 13 .6.1 and
13.6.2, whichever is earlier. If the Parties fail to reach an
agreement pursuant to 13.6.1 and 13.6.2 during the five year
period then the interim provisions shall extend for a further
term ending December 31, 1999 .
13.6.7 All new and incremental costs of implementing the interim
provisions in 13.6.4 incurred by the Yukon shall be paid by
Canada in accordance with guidelines to be negotiatedby the
Yukon and Canada.

